DBlazer325@aol.com wrote:
> to whom it may concern:
>
> The question of human consciousness is best answered in terms of brain
> function. If there is no brain, there is no consciousness. More
> specifically, over the last sixty years, researchers have found that
> different parts of the brain do specific things. Speech, spatial
> perception, sight, tactile sensation and motor function are all
> specifically located. An example is sight. Besides the regular and
> necessary neural path for sight, there is a more primitive sight path
> for avoiding being hit. The result of that is one can be blind, but
> still avoid limbs from hitting face. More significantly, there is the
> death of a person when their heart stops. But, brain function can be
> lost in pieces, resulting in a person not having full brain function.
> Physical death and brain death is confused. Injury and age can result
> in brain damage. This brain damage implies less capability. People
> loose mental capability and loose the full perceptive consciousness
> before they finally die. With death, the consciousness ends. Full
> consciouness may have ended before the physical death.

The effects you describe do exist and yet this direction does not lead to a theory of consciousness. An analogy: you don't interprete software in terms of hardware do you. There is an even better analogy. Classical mathematics defines a set by describing its internal structure, internal relations etc. In contrast, the category theory defines a set entirely in terms of relations this set has with other sets. All the sets are regarded as pointlike (structureless) and are connected by abstract
arrows. A few simple axioms are introduced - the central one is: if there is an arrow from A to B, and if there is an arrow from B to C, then there is an arrow from A to C. So each set is characterized by the specific FIGURE the arrows form around it. Amazingly, this figure characterizes the set completely - no reference to the internal structure is needed. In fact, the two interpretations of the set - classical ("internal") and categorical ("external") are self-sufficient and complementary.

Now if we wish to build a theory of mind, it must be adequate. How does a mind function - by considering the processes in the brain or by considering external objects having cause-effect relationships with the body? Obviously the latter is the case - mind is totally unaware of the processes in the brain. So an adequate theory must do - it must create abstract "external" figures as possible schemes according to which a mind functions. In my view, the mathematical category theory is much more than an analogy.

Pentcho